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Abstract: We study an optimal weak collusion-proof auction in an en-
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their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude
on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential collud-
ers can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The
second-best outcome — i.e., the noncollusive optimum — can be made
weak collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are
multiple bidding rings, or the second-best outcome involves a nontrivial
probability of the object not being sold. In case the second-best is not
weak collusion proof, we characterize an optimal weak collusion-proof
auction. This auction involves nontrivial exclusion of collusive bidders
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The possibility that some agents may collude is an important concern in organization design.
Nowhere is the concern more pronounced than in auctions where bidders can manipulate or
simply withdraw their bids to limit competition. Not surprisingly, auctions have provided the
volume and prominence to the study of collusion, with evidence of collusion documented in
a variety of auctions ranging from highway construction contracts (Porter and Zona (1993)),
timber sales (Baldwin et al. (1997)), to school milk delivery (Pesendorfer (2000), and Porter
and Zona (1999)).
Thanks to the resurgence of interest in collusion, we have by now a fairly good under-
standing about how bidders overcome their informational asymmetry to achieve successful
collusion.1 Less is known, except for a handful of recent research, is to what extent and how a
mechanism can be designed to deal with collusion. The issue at the heart is the informational
asymmetry facing potential colluders. If the colluders had complete information about one
another, they could behave as if they were a single agent; the only issue then would be to
enforce their agreement. Consequently, there would be no role for auction design in preventing
collusion, other than to undermine the enforcement power of the colluders. If the colluders
had asymmetric information, however, auction design may exploit that informational asym-
metry to disrupt collusion even when they have strong enforcement power. Consequently, the
presence of informational asymmetry makes the role of auction design nontrivial.
Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2001) offered a tractable modeling framework for analyz-
ing the role of colluders’ informational asymmetry in organization design. Following their
framework, Che and Kim (2006) have shown that the information asymmetry can be ex-
ploited to such an extent that collusion problem can be avoided at no cost in a broad set of
circumstances. Their method of collusion-proofing — namely “selling the firm” to potential
colluders — requires that no coalition be formed prior to all potential colluders participating
into the mechanism. While this assumption may be realistic in some circumstances, it may
1Graham and Marshall (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1992), Mailath and Zemsky (1991), Eso and
Schummer (200?) and Marshall and Marx (2003) study collusion in one-shot auctions of various formats,
while Aoyagi (2003), Blume and Heidhues (2002), Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) and Abdulkadirog˘lu and
Chung (2003) study collusion in repeated auctions.
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not be appropriate in settings such as auctions where bidders may be intimately familiar with
their opponents even before participating. In fact, an allegedly predominant form of collusion
involves bidders coordinating on their participation decisions: Colluders either refuse to par-
ticipate or withdraw their bids to let a designated ring member win without competition. It
turns out that “selling the firm to the potential coalition” provides an ineffective protection
to the auction designer from such collusion on participation.
This leads us to the main questions of the current paper: Can an auction be designed to
exploit the informational asymmetry even when the agents can coordinate on their partici-
pation decisions? If so, to what extent can the collusion problem be dealt with and what is
the nature of the resulting optimal collusion-proof auction? We address these questions in the
single-unit auctions environment.
A few authors have studied these questions. In the context of first-price auctions, McAfee
and McMillan (1992) argued that the bidders can overcome informational asymmetry com-
pletely if they can use transfers, meaning that they can in fact behave as if they are a single
agent maximizing their joint interest. The same result is established in a fully general set-
ting (i.e., without assuming a particular auction form) by Dequiedt (2005), who showed that
the seller can never expect to exploit the agents’ informational asymmetry in dealing with
their collusion — that is, the colluding agents can behave like a single agent — if collusion
is organized by a third party who can commit not only to enforce the side contract agreed
upon by the agents but also to punish a unilaterally disagreeing agent to the worst possible
level. This result clearly provides an upper bound on what collusive agents can accomplish in
an adverse selection environment, and thus a lower bound on what the auction designer can
achieve. Yet, this benchmark may not be practically the most useful. In practice, it is likely
that bidders are limited in their abilities to punish a deviator. In particular, the minmax
punishment assumed in Dequiedt (2005) may not be credible against a bidder who refuses to
collude. In this sense, the concept of collusion-proofness underlying the negative view may be
too strong.
It is thus useful to pursue a different approach — one based on a less extreme presumption
of the coalition’s punishment capabilities. In this regard, Laffont-Martimort’s weak collusion-
proofness offers a sensible alternative in the modelling of collusion. This notion presumes
coalition’s punishment capability to be limited to a level achievable by the standard noncoop-
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erative play. A noncooperative play provides a compelling scenario of what may occur when
a collusion attempt fails. We thus explore the above questions with this notion of collusion.
As will be seen below, the adoption of this weak collusion-proofness notion has a dramatic
consequence: The the standard second-best outcome — i.e., the noncollusive optimum — can
be made weak collusion-proof for symmetric bidders if at least one bidder is noncollusive or
there are multiple bidding rings, or if the second best involves nontrivial probability of not
selling to collusive bidders.
The main idea behind our collusion-proof implementation is explained as follows. As will
be seen, in a collusion-proof auction, the seller cannot extract any entry fees from the coalition
when the good is not allocated to its member, or else the coalition would simply boycott the
auction. Further, when the good is sold to any coalition, the seller cannot price discriminate
the coalition based on the types of its members. The inability to price-discriminate means
that, to attain the second-best outcome, the seller may have to charge a sufficiently high
(uniform) price to the coalition, sometimes even higher than their members’ valuations. Why
can the coalition members then not simply boycott the auction in such a case? Indeed,
boycotting an auction whenever the coalition suffers ex post loss would increase the joint
payoff of its members. This does not occur in our auction, however, due to the way it exploits
the informational asymmetry facing the coalition members. In particular, our collusion-proof
auction makes it impossible for the surplus from collusion to be shared across types to make
them all better off. For instance, in our collusion-proof auction, boycotting an auction would
reduce the informational rents accruing to the highest valuation bidder, thus causing the latter
type bidder to object to the boycott. For this reason, an auction rule that forces collusive
bidders to sustain some ex post loss can be made collusion proof, unless the amount of ex
post loss is too large. In particular, the second-best is weak collusion-proof implementable if
there is at least one noncollusive bidder or there are multiple bidding rings or the second best
outcome involves nontrivial exclusion of bidders with low valuations. The same logic applies to
the case the second-best is not weak collusion proof, implying that an optimal collusion-proof
auction involves a positive probability of not selling to any collusive bidder.
Our approach is closest to Pavlov (2006), who also studies the optimal auctions that are
weak collusion proof.2 His analysis concerns only the case of grand collusion — when the
2Other authors have studied optimal collusion-proof mechanisms in different contexts. Quesada (2004) finds
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entire bidders are involved in a single bidding ring — and focuses only on ex ante symmetric
bidders.3 The current paper goes much beyond that environment. First of all, we consider
the general case in which a subset (or subsets) of bidders is (are) collusive. In fact, the most
important result concerns the case in which a proper subset of bidders is collusive — i.e.,
at least one bidder is noncollusive or there are multiple bidding rings — in which case the
second-best outcome is shown to be collusion-proof implementable. Second, we can handle
the case of ex ante asymmetric bidders, at least for the case of grand collusion: We show
that the second-best outcome is collusion-proof implementable, given a somewhat stronger
condition than is needed for the symmetric bidders case. Third, our model of collusion differs
from his in that we allow members of collusion to reallocate the good once it is sold to one of
the members.
Above all, the ability to handle collusion by a subset(s) of bidders is practically important
and useful. In many circumstances, not all bidders are in a position to collude. Government
auctions used in defense procurement, mineral extraction, or spectrum licenses, competition
often have incumbents with long history of operation competing against relative new comers.
Long term interaction and shared experiences among the incumbents will put them in a
better position to collude than the new comers. Likewise, in auctions for construction repairs
or food service procurement, competition may involve both local and non-local providers, and
the former group may be able to collude more effectively, based on their regular contacts and
the trade association relationships. The problem of only a subset of bidders being collusive
introduces a new challenge, since the coalition may prey on noncollusive agents as much as
on the seller. Hence, a collusion-proof design must eliminate incentives for the coalition to
engage in such behavior.
an optimal collusion-proof mechanism in the LM setting where an (informed) agent proposes a side contract.
In fact, she treats collusion on participation, but adopts the strong notion similar to Dequiedt (2003) where
the side contract can impose maximum punishment on refusing agents. Jeon and Menicucci (2005) shows that
second-best is achievable in the weak collusion proof sense, much like Che and Kim (2006), in the nonlinear
pricing context. Laffont and Martimort (1998), Celik (2004) and Faure-Grimaud et al. (2004) study the
optimality of delegation in the presence of collusive agents.
3Our results for the grand collusion case, i.e., Theorem 5, is similar to his, but the results are obtained
independently. As will be apparent, the methods of analyses are quite different. Of course, the results on
other subjects, particularly the subgroup collusion, are completely novel here.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates collusion on participation
and illustrates the main design features of collusion-proof auctions. Section 3 introduces an
auction model and describes the second-best outcome in a collusion-free environment. Section
4 introduces a model of collusion and the notion of weak collusion-proof auctions. Section 5
identifies the properties of weak collusion-proof auctions and use them to derive a condition
that is necessary and sufficient for implementing the second-best outcome in a collusion-proof
fashion. In Section 6, we characterize the optimal collusion-proof auction when the second-best
is not collusion-proof implementable. Section 7 concludes.
2 Illustration by an Example
Suppose a seller has an object to sell to one of three bidders, each with valuation θi drawn
privately and uniformly from [1, 2]. If the seller values the object at zero, she can do no better
than using a standard auction, say a second-price auction. Bidders have weak dominant
strategies of bidding their valuations, and the bidder with the highest valuation wins. This
generates the expected revenue of 3/2, which is the most the seller can obtain from any feasible
selling mechanism.
Standard auctions are susceptible to collusion, however. Suppose bidders 1 and 2 can
collude on their bids. Then, they will select, say via a knock out auction between them, the
bidder with the higher valuation and have him bid his valuation and the other bid 1, or the
lowest possible bid.4 Although the noncollusive bidder (bidder 3) will continue to bid his
valuation, the collusion will cause the revenue to fall; whenever the noncollusive bidder has
the lowest valuation, the seller collects that amount rather than the second-highest valuation.
If collusion occurs only after the bidders participate, then Che and Kim (2006)’s mechanism
(henceforth referred to as “CK mechanism”) can implement the second-best revenue of 3
2
for
the seller. The CK mechanism effectively sells the object at a fixed price of 3
2
to the two
collusive bidders (or more precisely their third-party representative), who then either allocate
the good between the two of them or turn around and sell the good to the third bidder at
4For instance, they can hold auction whereby the winner (the high bidder) pays his bid to the loser for
the right to participate the official auction without any competition from the other collusive bidder. One can
easily confirm existence of a symmetric monotonic equilibrium in which the high valuation bidder wins.
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price, p(θ3) := E[max{θ1, θ2}|max{θ1, θ2} < θ3] if he bids θ3 — the price he would have paid
in a collusion-free environment. The CK mechanism replicates the same interim incentives as
the second price auction but guarantees the seller an ex post constant revenue of 3
2
whenever
all bidders participate. If bidders do not collude on participating, they will indeed participate.
This mechanism would not work, however, if the two bidders collude on participation. Suppose
their valuations are both close to 1. Then, they will most likely sell the object to bidder 3 at
a price close to 1
2
= E[θ3], so they will have to pay 1 out of their pockets. Hence, they will
coordinate not to participate in such cases.
Here we suggest a different auction rule. This auction rule, which will be explained later
in a greater detail, allocates the object efficiently, just like the second-price auction. The rule
differs from both the second-price auction and from the CK mechanism, in the following way.
Unlike the latter, bidders 1 and 2 are charged only when the object is allocated to them.
Further, the joint sale price charged to them depends only on bidder 3’s bid, specifically equal
to 2b3 − 54 , where b3 is bidder 3’s bid. This feature makes it difficult for the coalition to
manipulate the sale price, for any attempt to reduce the price cause the probability of their
winning to fall. Since bidder 3 bids his valuation as a dominant strategy and the allocation
is efficient, when a collusive bidder, say with valuation θ, wins, the coalition ends up paying
θ − 1
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, high enough to extract the same payment from the collusive bidders as in a collusion-
free environment. Since the auction leaves net surplus to the coalition, it has no incentive to
boycott the auction, regardless of θ. In fact, this auction is weak collusion proof, even though
bidders 1 and 2 can collude on their participation decisions. We shall revisit this example,
along with others, for a more in-depth discussion.
3 Primitives
A risk-neutral seller has an object for sale. The seller’s valuation of the object is normalized
to zero. There are n ≥ 2 risk-neutral buyers who each independently draw a value, θi, on
the object from an interval Θi := [θi, θi] ⊂ R+ according to distribution Fi, which has strictly
positive density fi on the support. We assume that both
Ji(θi) := θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)









and Eθ˜−i [·] :=
∫
Θ−i
[·]d(∏j 6=i Fj(θj)) denote expectation operators based on the prior distribu-
tion, where Θ :=
∏
i∈N Θi and Θ−i :=
∏
j 6=iΘj.
For a later analysis, it is analytically convenient to augment each bidder’s type space to
include his “participation decision” as part of each buyer’s possible type. Specifically, we let θ∅
denote “non-participation” or “exit” option available to each buyer, and define Θi := {θ∅}∪Θi.
We then let θ := (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ Θ :=
∏
i∈N Θi denote a possible profile of types in these enriched
type spaces. Since we shall consider randomization in coalition members’ reports over their
augmented type spaces, it is convenient to consider arbitrary probability distribution, µC ,
over ΘC :=
∏
i∈C Θi for any C ⊂ N and to use EµC [·] :=
∫
ΘC
[·]d(µC(θC)) as an expectation
operator relative to µC .
We now describe arbitrary auction rules, and we do so in direct mechanisms. An auction
rule,M = (q, t), consists of an allocation rule, q = (q1, · · · , qn) : Θ 7→ [0, 1]n with
∑
i∈N qi(θ) ≤
1, ∀θ ∈ Θ, and a payment rule, t = (t1, ..., tn) : Θ 7→ Rn, such that qi(θ∅, θ−i) = ti(θ∅, θ−i) =
0,∀i.θ−i ∈ Θ−i. An auction rule determines, for each profile of bidders’ reports in Θ, a vector of
probabilities for the bidders to obtain the object and a vector of expected payments they must
pay, subject to the constraint that, if a bidder invokes the non-participation option, he does
not receive the good and collects his reservation utility, normalized to zero. Any equilibrium
arising in any auction game can be described as an auction rule in this framework, so we
sometimes use an “outcome” interchangeably with an auction rule.
Fix an auction rule, M = (q, t). Buyer i’s interim payoff when his valuation is θi ∈ Θi but
reports θ˜i ∈ Θi is
uMi (θ˜i, θi) := θiQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i),
where Qi(θi) := Eθ−i [qi(θ)] and Ti(θi) := Eθ−i [ti(θ)]. Given hidden information and the avail-
ability of the non-participation option, an auction rule must be incentive compatible and
individually rational to be consistent with equilibrium. We say an auction rule M is feasible
if
UMi (θi) := u
M
i (θi, θi) ≥ uMi (θ˜i, θi), ∀i, θi ∈ Θi, θ˜i ∈ Θi. (IC∗)
Note that (IC∗) subsumes both incentive compatibility and individual rationality; for instance,
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with θ˜i = θ∅, (IC∗) requires
UMi (θi) ≥ uMi (θ∅, θi) = 0. (IR)
Let M denote the set of all feasible auction rules. For later analysis, the following charac-
terization of feasible auction rules proves useful. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix C
unless stated otherwise.
Lemma 0. If M = (q, t) ∈M, then, for each θi ∈ Θi,
UMi (θi) = E
[
Ki(θ˜i)qi(θ˜)1{θ˜i≤θi} + Ji(θ˜i)qi(θ˜)1{θ˜i≥θi} − ti(θ˜)
]
. (1)
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider a collusion-free environment. It is by now well










and its associated outcome is characterized as follows:
Theorem 0. (Myerson) An optimal mechanism that solves [NC] involves the allocation
rule given by ∀θ ∈ Θ,
q∗i (θ) =
{
1 if Ji(θi) > max{0,maxk 6=i Jk(θk)},
0 otherwise,
and the revenue equal to








To avoid trivial cases, we assume that V ∗ > maxi∈N θi. Let θˆi := min{θi ∈ [θi, θ¯i]|J−1i (θ) ≥
0} denote each bidder i’s threshold type. Then, the optimal mechanism allocates the good to
the bidder with highest virtual valuation Ji(θi) as long as θi ≥ θˆi.
4 A Model of Collusion
Following LM and CK, we envision subsets of bidders (henceforth called coalitions) enforcing
side contracts via uninformed representatives to influence the outcome of the auction game
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being played. Formally, a coalition structure is an arbitrary partition C on N whose element
C ∈ C represents a coalition of bidders who “may” collude with one another. This framework
encompasses a range of possibilities that include the grand coalition (i.e., C = {N}), that
allows for the presence of noncollusive bidders (i.e., some elements of C may be singleton)
and/or for multiple bidding rings (i.e., C may include Cj, j = 1, ..., k with |Cj| ≥ 2). The
coalition structure C is a common knowledge for all bidders in N and for the seller. The
assumption that the seller knows the coalition structure, albeit not innocuous, may not be as
restrictive as it may appear. For instance, our analysis would still apply if some coalition may
not collude effectively. Also, the structure of potential bidding rings (who is likely to collude
with whom) can be sometimes discerned from prior auction experiences and other industry
observables.5 Of course, none of these issues arise if there is only one coalition, as has been
assumed in all existing papers. In this sense, the current model generalizes all existing models
of collusion.
The time line is similar to that of LM and CK, except for one important difference:
Coalitions are formed prior to the bidders’ participation into the mechanism.
• Time line:
• At date 0, each bidder learns his type, θi, drawn from Θi.
• At date 1, the seller proposes an auction rule M ∈M.
• At date 2, the (uninformed) representative of each coalition C ∈ C simultaneously
proposes a collusive side contract (to be described in detail later), which each member
of C accepts or rejects. If all bidders accept, then collusion is active; or else, it is inactive.
• At date 3, each bidder, i ∈ N , chooses θ˜i ∈ Θi; i.e., he accepts or rejects M , and reports
from Θi if he accepts. (If collusion is active, then the collusive bidders report according
to the side contract in force.)
5Che and Kim (2006) accommodate, to a degree, a possible ignorance of the coalition structure. Unfortu-
nately, with collusion on participation, WCP implementation requires a precise knowledge by the seller about
the coalition structure she is faced with.
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• At date 4, if collusion by a coalition is active, then the outcome of their side contract
arises. If no collusion is active, then M results.
• Technological Feasibility of Collusion:
We assume that each coalition has at its disposal four instruments: (a) its members’
participation decisions, (b) participating members’ communication with the seller (e.g., bids),
(c) reallocation of the good within the coalition, in case a member of that coalition receives the
good, and (d) side payments that the coalition members can exchange in a balanced-budget
fashion. These four instruments together encompass all possible ways in which a coalition can
coordinate their members’ behavior.
To formally describe possible manipulations utilizing all these instruments, fix a possible
coalition C ∈ C, and an auction rule M = (q, t) ∈ M the seller may propose. It is useful
to think of the coalition as choosing a manipulation, i.e., an outcome that will emerge if
its members carry out their collusive deviation from an original auction rule and the others,
including noncollusive bidders and members of different coalitions, report truthfully. We say
an outcome, M˜ = (q˜, t˜) is a manipulation of M by coalition C, if there exists a function,
µC : ΘC → ∆ΘC , that maps from their types in ΘC into a probability distribution over ΘC





qi(θ˜C , θN\C)], (RMC )












t˜i(θ) = EµC(θC)[ti(θ˜C , θN\C)].∀i ∈ N\C. (BBMN\C)
These conditions are explained as follows. First, condition (RMC ) says that any manipula-
tion M˜ by coalition C should be generated by some randomization µC(θC) over its members’
participation/reports plus some reallocation within that coalition, when bidders outside C
report truthfully. More precisely, any admissible manipulation allocates the good to the
coalition with the same probability as the original auction rule (chosen by the seller) under
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µC . Condition (BBMC ) allows the coalition members to exchange side transfers in a budget-
balanced fashion. Since budget balancing is required at the ex ante level, we are even allowing
for the coalition to finance (from a competitive capital market) across different realizations
of its members’ type profiles.6 Conditions (RMN\C) and (BB
M
N\C) simply assume that bidders
outside C are not colluding: there is no reallocation and no exchange of side payments among
all bidders outside C and between C and N\C. This presumption would be without any
loss if N\C were all noncollusive. Even if N\C may involve some bidding rings, the above
conditions are still sufficient for there to be an equilibrium with no collusion, since they ensure
that the representative of each coalition offers a null side contract when other coalitions null
side contracts.
• Incentive Feasibility of Collusion
For collusive manipulation to work, the members of the coalition must have the incentive
to carry out the manipulation. We say that M˜ is feasible if it satisfies
U M˜i (θi) ≥ uM˜i (θ˜i, θi), ∀i ∈ C, θi ∈ Θi, θ˜i ∈ Θi. (IC∗C)
and
U M˜i (θi) ≥ UMi (θi), ∀i ∈ C, θi ∈ Θi. (IRMC )
These conditions are explained as follows. First of all, (IC∗C) requires the outcome result-
ing from collusion to be incentive compatible to all members of coalition. Since the coalition
members face asymmetric information about one another, this condition must hold, regard-
less of the specifics of how the coalition is formed and how the members bargain over their
collusive arrangement. Next, (IRMC ) requires that each member of the coalition must do as
well with the proposed manipulation as they would by vetoing that manipulation and acting
noncooperatively. Clearly, what each member will get in the latter event depends on the
inferences made by the members of the coalition about that agent. Condition (IRMC ) assumes
that no new inferences about the members’ types are made in such an event. This “passivity”
of out-of-equilibrium beliefs is an important element of LM’s weak collusion-proofness notion.
6Our results do not change, if budget balancing is required at the ex post level. Clearly, our collusion proof
implementation result would be stronger with the ex ante version of budget balancing, explaining our choice.
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While there could be collusive agreements supported by non-passive beliefs, the passive belief
restriction seems reasonable in many settings.
Lastly, note these conditions are imposed only for the coalition members. Clearly, the
coalition need not care about the welfare or incentives of noncollusive agents. We turn next
to the notions of collusion-proofness we focus on throughout the paper.
Definition WCP. An auction rule M ∈ M is weak collusion-proof (henceforth, WCP), if,
for each coalition C ∈ C with |C| ≥ 2, any feasible manipulation of M by C makes no member
of C strictly better off.
To explain this notion, suppose the seller offers an auction rule M . If M is WCP, then, for
each coalition C, there exists no feasible manipulation that would make some members of C
strictly better, given that all other coalitions are inactive. Hence, if a third party representative
of C maximizes the joint payoffs of C, just as LM presumed, then there will be an equilibrium
in representatives of coalitions propose no collusive manipulations — or equivalently, they all
propose null side contracts).
Our WCP notion is comparable to the WCP of LM, except for a couple of differences. First,
we allow for randomization and reallocation possibilities in the collusive agents. Second, we
allow for proper subsets of bidders to be collusive, which add a new wrinkle in collusion-proof
auction design. In particular, it becomes important for the seller to prevent each coalition not
only from extracting rents from herself but also from preying on bidders outside that coalition.
5 Collusion-Proof Implementability of the Second-Best
Outcome
In this section, we characterize the properties that WCP auction rules must satisfy (Lemma 1
and 2) and use these properties to obtain a necessary condition for the second-best outcome
to be WCP implementable (Theorem 1). We then show that, for symmetric bidders, the
necessary condition is also sufficient for the WCP implementability of the second-best outcome.
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5.1 Properties of WCP Auction Rules
Fix a coalition C ∈ C, and an auction rule M = (q, t) that the seller proposes. It is useful
to have a few definitions. Let qCi (θC) := Eθ˜N\C [qi(θC , θ˜N\C)]. Let qC(θ) :=
∑
i∈C qi(θ) and
QC(θC) := Eθ˜N\C [qC(θC , θ˜N\C)] denote the probability that the auction rule allocates to good
to a member of the coalition given the value profile of all bidders and that of the coalition
members, respectively. Let QC := [0, supθC∈ΘC QC(θC)] be the set of all probabilities with
which the coalition can secure the good to its members under M . This set contains zero since
all its members can boycott the auction (i.e., QC(θ∅, · · · , θ∅) = 0. This set is convex since the
coalition members can randomize between boycotting and reporting some profile θC ∈ ΘC .
We then obtain our first property of WCP auction rules.
Lemma 1. If M = (q, t) ∈ M is WCP, then for each C ∈ C there exists a convex function,






= r(QC(θC)),∀θC ∈ ΘC .
In a WCP auction rule, the seller cannot collect any fee from a coalition when its members
never obtain the good. This feature arises from the abilities by the buyers to collude on their
participation decisions; were they charged positive entry fees, they could all simply refuse to
participate. Similarly, the collusive bidders can never be charged different prices for the same
probability of obtaining the good; or else, they could manipulate their reports (or bids) to pick
the lowest price for a given probability of obtaining the good. The surplus generated from
such manipulation can be shared among all coalition members via appropriate side transfers
and reallocations so that (IC∗) and (IRMC ) conditions are satisfied. Finally, the sale price is
(weakly) convex in the probability of the object being allocated to any coalition member, since
the coalition members can at least randomize between non-participation and any probability
of allocation attainable by some reports.
The next property is obtained for a class of allocation rules satisfying monotonicity : qC(·)
is nondecreasing in θC and, for all i ∈ C, qi(·) is nondecreasing in θi and nonincreasing in θ−i.
Let M0 ⊂ M denote the set of auction rules satisfying this monotonicity. The monotonic
auction rules are reasonable and account for a large class of auction allocations, including
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the first-best and second-best auction rules. Next, we define the average price charged to the





if QC(θC) > 0,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 2. If M = (q, t) ∈M0 is WCP, then ∀ C ∈ C, ∀ i ∈ C and for almost every θC ∈ ΘC,
(Ki(θi)− p(θC)) qCi (θC) ≥ max
θ′i∈{θ∅}∪[θi,θi]
(Ki(θi)− p(θ′i, θC−i)) qCi (θ′i, θC−i). (2)
This lemma captures the sense in which each coalition is able or unable to “behave like
a single agent.” Specifically, condition (2) resembles an incentive compatibility constraint for
a “single” agent who may realize one of |C| alternative values. But this resemblance is not
perfect. First, that agent realizes “pseudo” value Ki(θi) rather than true value θi. Second, the
agent’s constraint is required only in one direction, i.e., not to under-report or withdraw from
the auction. Third, the agent may not be able to shift his consumption among the alternative
uses. All together, these features serve to limit the extent to which the coalition can coordinate
their members’ behavior. For instance, the fact that pseudo values, rather than true values,
matter means that the coalition can be forced to sustain some ex post loss. Since Ki(θi) > θi,
an average price p(θi) > θi need not violate the above constraint. The coalition’s limited
ability to coordinate their behavior arises from the fact that any collusive defection requires
a consensus from all types of bidders. Typically, different types of bidders have conflicting
interests, say about consumption of the good by any particular type θi. Suppose θi < p(θC),
so ex post loss arises from the consumption by type θi. Although the coalition wishes to cancel
such consumption, the highest type of bidder i would be reluctant to cancel such consumption,
as long as Ki(θi) > p(θC). But if the latter inequality fails, all types of bidder, including the
highest type, will benefit from canceling the sale to type θi. In this sense, the pseudo value
Ki(θi), limits the degree of ex post loss that can be feasibly imposed on the coalition without
triggering its defection.
Naturally, the necessary conditions for WCP implementation (given by Lemma 1 and 2)
constrain the set of circumstances in which the second-best outcome is WCP implementable.
We next characterize these circumstances. To this end, fix any bidder i ∈ C for some C ∈ C
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with |C| ≥ 2. For each profile θN\C ∈ ΘN\C , let
φi(θN\C) := inf{θi ∈ Θi | Ji(θi) ≥ max{ max
j∈N\C
Jj(θj), 0}}
denote the lowest type of bidder i that can obtain the good with positive probability in
the second-best allocation, when bidders outside C have types θN\C . Consider the following
condition:













] =: r∗,∀i ∈ N.














This condition is explained as follows. The RHS of the inequalities represents the amount
of surplus that should be extracted from the coalition to implement the second-best payoff for
the seller. As will be shown next, the LHS of the inequalities represent the highest payment
that can be charged against the coalition, given the second-best allocation, q∗. Thus, the
inequalities are necessary for the second-best outcome to be WCP implementable.
Theorem 1. (Necessity) Condition (SB) is necessary for the second-best outcome to be
WCP implementable.
5.2 WCP Implementation of the Second-Best Outcome: Symmet-
ric Bidders
Here we show that Condition (SB) is also sufficient for the second-best outcome to be WCP
implementable when bidders are symmetric. Specifically, we construct an auction rule that
will WCP implement the second-best outcome, given (SB). Further, this sufficient condition
will be seen to hold if either at least one bidder is noncollusive or the second-best mechanism
involves a nontrivial probability of no sale.
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We begin with the symmetry assumption: Fi(·) =: F (·) for all i ∈ N , for some common
cdf F (·) which has a positive density f . The associated virtual valuations J and K are
defined analogously, and their monotonicity properties are maintained. Likewise, we let θˆ =
inf{θ|J(θ) ≥ 0}. Condition (SB) is now more succinctly described in this environment.
Define first θ
(1)
C := maxi∈C θi and θ
(1)
N\C := max{maxi∈N\C θi, θˆ}. (We adopt a convention
that θ
(1)
N\C := θˆ when C = {N}.) Then, Condition (SB) simplifies to:










C )|θ(1)C > θ(1)N\C
]
.
As pointed out earlier, this condition requires a collusive bidder’s valuation to be sufficiently
high whenever the good is allocated to him. It turns the exact requirement is not very onerous.
The condition holds if at least one buyer is noncollusive or there are more than one bidding
ring, or if the cutoff threshold θˆ is sufficiently high.





N )|θ(1)N > θˆ
]
. (3)
In case all bidders are collusive (i.e., C = {N}), Condition (SB′), or equivalently (3), is
not trivial. For instance, if θˆ = θ, then K(θˆ) = θ, so the condition fails. Although the case
of grand coalition appears distinct from the case of C 6= {N}, the same logic applies. In both
cases, exclusion of collusive bidders is needed for WCP implementation. This objective is
accomplished in the latter case by allocating the object to noncollusive bidders or to collusive
bidders in a different bidding ring, whereas in the case of grand coalition, the necessary
exclusion can only be accomplished by not selling the object to any bidder.
We now construct an auction rule that WCP implements the second-best outcome when
Condition (SB′) holds. Let M∗ = (q∗, t∗) denote the second-price auction with a reserve price
θˆ, which implements the second-best outcome. Consider a new auction rule Mˆ = (q∗, tˆ). This
auction rule has the same allocation rule as M∗, but has a payment rule tˆ(·) that satisfies two
properties: (i) For each bidder i ∈ N , Eθ˜−i [tˆi(θi, θ˜−i)] = Eθ˜−i [tˆi(θi, θ˜−i)], so that each bidder
has the same interim incentives as with M ; and (ii) Each coalition C ∈ C with |C| ≥ 2 is
charged a single sale price, payable only when the object is allocated to its member. It is
easy to understand the purpose of these properties. Property (i) ensures that Mˆ provides the
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same interim incentives to the bidders asM∗. Property (ii) ensures that each coalition cannot
manipulate the sale price charged against its members.
The sale price against each coalition C ∈ C (with |C| ≥ 2) is constructed as follows. Let











C )|θ(1)C > θ(1)N\C
]
. (4)





N\C)+(1−αC)J(θ(1)N\C). Notice this sale price is defined in terms of
the highest type of bidder outside C — but set above J(θ
(1)
N\C) just enough to extract J(θ
(1)
C )
on average from the highest valuation bidder in C.
We now set the payment rule tˆ to satisfy both (i) and (ii). First, for each noncollusive
bidder i (i.e., {i} ∈ C), we set tˆi(θ) := t∗i (θ), ∀θ. For each collusive bidder i ∈ C for each


























It can be checked that Mˆ has the same interim payments as M∗: Eθ˜−i [tˆi(θi, θ˜−i)] =
Eθ˜−i [t
∗
i (θi, θ˜−i)]. Hence, Mˆ satisfies (IC
∗) and implements V ∗. In addition, Mˆ satisfies prop-
erty (ii), for
∑
i∈C tˆi(θ) = δC(θ) for all θ. We are now ready to present the sufficiency result.
Theorem 2. (Sufficiency) Given Condition (SB′), the mechanism Mˆ is WCP and
achieves the second-best revenue.
Combining Lemma 3 with Theorem 2 produces one of the main results of this paper.
Corollary 1. The second-best outcome is WCP implementable if C 6= {N}, or if C = {N}
but (3) holds.
In words, the second-best outcome is weak collusion-proof implementable if either there
exists at least one noncollusive bidder or there are multiple bidding rings. In these cases, the
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seller can leverage the presence of these bidders to extract sufficient rents from each coalition.
If entire bidders form a bidding coalition, then no such leverage exists, but the seller can still
use the threat of no sale to accomplish the same objective as long as that threat is sufficiently
credible in the sense of (3).
Remark 1. The WCP auction can be made incentive compatible in dominant strategies for
all noncollusive bidders and for all collusive bidders except for one in each coalition. This
auction has all bidders bid simultaneously and allocates the object to the highest bidder (with
ties broken randomly) with valuation exceeding θˆ. If a noncollusive bidder wins, he pays the
highest losing bid or θˆ, whichever is higher, just like the second-price auction. For collusive
bidders in any coalition C, one bidder, say i ∈ C, is designated as a ring leader. Whenever
a bidder in C wins, bidder i pays to the seller HC(max{maxi∈N\C bi, θˆ}). If bidder j ∈ C\{i}
wins, he pays the highest losing bid to bidder i. In addition, each j pays to i some amount
1
|C|−1∆C(b1) that depends only on i’s bid. Clearly, all bidders except the ring leaders have weak
dominant strategies of bidding their valuations. Further, ∆C(·) can be set to make it a best
response for each ring leader to bid his valuation and to satisfy interim individual rationality
for all coalition members.7 This auction rule implements the same sale price HC(·) (using ring
leaders as direct contact points), so it is WCP. In fact, if there is only one bidding coalition,
this auction is WCP in a more robust sense: The seller receives the payoff of V ∗ in every
equilibrium supported by passive beliefs. Every manipulation by the lone coalition generates
the same expected payment and allocation rule as M∗, and does not affect the incentives of
the noncollusive bidders. Hence, the second best is implementable even if collusion may arise
7Let η(b1) denote the expected payment bidder 1 makes to the seller minus the expected payment other
collusive bidders make to bidder 1, when bidder 1 bids b1. Note that η(b1) is a constant for b1 < θˆ, which we







max{s, θˆ}dFn−1(s) if b1 ≥ θˆ
η0 otherwise.
Given others are bidding their valuations, bidder 1 with type θ1 solves
max
b1






max{s, θˆ}dFn−1(s) if b1 ≥ θˆ
0 otherwise.
From this, one can easily see that it is optimal to set b1 = θ1, which leads to the same interim payoff for each
θ1 as in the second-best. Finally, one can verify that E[∆C(θ1)] = 0.
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on the equilibrium path.8
The following examples illustrate two different scenarios.
Example 1. (C = {{1, 2}}) Suppose there are two bidders each with valuation drawn uni-
formly from [0, 1]. According to Theorem 0, the second-best outcome allocates the object ef-
ficiently for valuation exceeding θˆ = 1
2
, and yields revenue of 1
2
. This also satisfies (3),
so the second-best is WCP implementable. The WCP auction rule charges a sale price of
r∗ = E[J(θ(1)N )|θ(1)N > θˆ] = 2/3 to the bidders, regardless of who wins and what their bids are.
Without collusion, each bidder receives the interim payoff of
U Mˆ(θ) =
{







if θ ∈ [1
2
, 1].
Since the coalition is charged a sale price of 2/3, it suffers an ex post loss whenever the highest




]. Why can they not simply boycott the auction in this situation? Indeed,
their joint surplus will increase by doing so. The problem, however, is that the increased
surplus cannot be allocated to benefit all types; some types will be strictly worse off and thus
object to that move. To illustrate, suppose indeed that the bidders boycott auction whenever
no bidder has valuation exceeding 2/3, and, otherwise, the high-valuation bidder consumes the












if θ ∈ [2
3
, 1].
8The same does not hold if there are multiple bidding rings. If a bidding ring is expected to run a
manipulation, this may affect the noncooperative payoffs of the other bidding rings in a way that may alter








Figure 1: Comparison between interim payoffs from Mˆ and M˜
As can be seen from Figure 1, a bidder benefits from this collusion when his valuation is less
than 0.524 but is strictly worse off if his valuation is higher. Hence, a collusive arrangement
M˜ is not feasible. (The same is true for any other feasible manipulations.) Even though
the net expected surplus may rise with some collusive manipulation, incentive compatibility
facing the collusive bidders limits the way surplus can be allocated across types to make them
uniformly better off. In this sense, our WCP auction exploits the informational asymmetry
facing the collusive bidders.
Example 2. (C = {{1, 2}, {3}}) Consider the example from Section 2, where there are two
collusive bidders and a noncollusive bidder, each with valuation drawn from [1, 2]. Here,
the presence of a noncollusive bidder is crucial for WCP implementability of the second-best
outcome. (If all three bidders were collusive, the second-best is not WCP implementable, for
the distribution fails (3).) Our WCP auction charges the sale price of H{1,2} = 2θ3 − 54 to
the coalition {1, 2}. The auction described in Remark 1 then works as follows. Given bids
(b1, b2, b3), bidder 2 pays ∆(b1) :=
2
3
b31− 218 b21+ 134 b1− 54 , win or lose, and if he wins, an additional
amount equal to the highest losing bid, all to bidder 1. If bidder 1 or 2 wins, then bidder 1
pays 2b3 − 54 to the seller. If bidder 3 wins, he pays the seller the highest losing bid. Clearly,
bidders 2 and 3 have weak dominant strategies of bidding their valuations. To these strategies,
it is a best response by bidder 1 to bid his valuation, as well. This equilibrium would generate
the same second-best revenue of 3/2 to the seller. Most importantly, the equilibrium is not
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susceptible to collusion by bidders 1 and 2 (in the weak collusion-proof sense). As mentioned
in Section 2, the coalition has no incentive to boycott the auction; but it would benefit from




when it is θ. Any such manipulation will leave
some types of bidder strictly worse off, and is thus not feasible.
5.3 WCP Implementation of the Second-Best Outcome: Asymmet-
ric Bidders
We now turn to the case of asymmetric bidders. In this case, the optimal noncollusive auction,
as characterized in Theorem 0, requires bidders to be treated differently based on their ex ante
distribution of types. This presents an extra challenge for the WCP implementation since,
as shown in Lemma 1, the same price is charged no matter which member of the coalition
receives the good. This does not mean, however, that the collusive bidders cannot be treated
differently, for different interests of the heterogeneous types can be exploited to make (IRMN )
difficult to satisfy. Indeed, we will show that the second-best outcome is WCP implementable
at least with respect to the grand coalition (i.e., C = {N}), under a condition that is not
much stronger than Condition (SB).
Consider now a strict inequality version of (SB)-(i):












Theorem 3. Assume C = {N} and Condition (SB∗) holds. Suppose also that (Ji(·) −
r∗)fi(·) is increasing in the interval [θi, J−1i (r∗)] for all i ∈ N . Then, there exists an auction
rule which is WCP and achieves the second-best outcome.
6 Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions
What happens if the second-best outcome is not collusion-proof implementable? What will
the optimal WCP auction look like in such a case? While a complete answer to this latter
question is unavailable, we provide two observations that will help answer that question. First,
we show that any optimal WCP auction in a general monotonic class involves “exclusion” —
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a positive probability that the object is not sold to a collusive bidder. Second, we characterize
the optimal WCP auction completely in the linear class for the case of symmetric bidders.
6.1 An Exclusion Principle
Lemma 1 implies that the seller can only charge a single sale price to collusive bidders, regard-
less of their types. Meanwhile, Lemma 2 says that this price cannot be too high relative to
the pseudo value, Ki(θi), of the collusive bidder who consumes the good. Combined together,
these lemmas imply that the seller must either charge a low sale price or else she should ex-
clude types with low pseudo values from consuming the good. A similar tradeoff exists even in
the collusion-free environment with respect to the setting of the reserve price, so the optimal
auction rule excludes low value types of the buyers in some situations. But the (collusion-free)
optimal auction does not involve any exclusion if the low types of buyers have sufficiently high
valuations, i.e., when Ji(θ) ≥ 0 ∀i. Collusion alters the tradeoff toward more exclusion, since
the seller can only charge a single sale price (whereas in the collusion-free environment, the
bidding competition typically generates higher payment from high valuation types beyond the
reserve price). In fact, we show below that the optimal auction rule in the monotonic class
must entail some exclusion of the collusive bidders.
Theorem 4 (Exclusion Principle). Assume that there are more than one bidder i ∈ C with
θi = θ := maxj∈C θj. Then, the optimal WCP mechanism in M0 requires that the object not
be sold to any member of C with a positive probability.
Proof. Let M = (q, t) denote the optimal WCP mechanism. Suppose to the contrary that∑
i∈C qi(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ, which implies by Lemma 1 that
∑
i∈C ti(θ) = r for some r.




Thus, the revenue cannot exceed θ. We now generate a contradiction by constructing a
WCP mechanism which raises a higher revenue than θ: Sell the object at a fixed price r˜,
which is slightly greater than θ, if and only if at least one member of C has a value higher
than r˜. This take-it-or-leave offer is clearly WCP and generates a revenue equal to R(r˜) :=
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Fj(θ) = 1 > 0,
where the last equality holds because for each i ∈ C, there exist at least one agent j 6= i for
whom Fj(θ) = 0.
Recall from Lemma 3 and Theorem 1 that the second-best with symmetric bidders is not
WCP implementable if it requires the sale to the coalition to occur with probability 1. The
above theorem establishes that any auction rule which allocates the object to the coalition
with probability 1 can never be optimal. The idea behind this result is simple: If the seller
tries to sell the object to all types, including the lowest type θ, then the (fixed) sale price can
never exceed θ, as implied by Lemma 2. Instead, the seller could make a take-it-or-leave offer
with a price slightly higher than θ, which is clearly WCP and will generate a higher revenue
than θ.
6.2 Optimal Linear WCP Auctions for Symmetric Bidders
Here, we search for an optimal WCP auction rule when Condition (SB) fails when bidders
are symmetric. This condition can only fail when all bidders are collusive (recall Lemma 3
or equivalently Corollary 1), so we focus on that case and assume C = {N}. Further, we
restrict our search to the class of linear auction rules where the aggregate payment schedule
is linear in the probability of sale (to any bidder):
∑
i∈N ti(θ) = r ·Q(θ), for some nonnegative
constant r.9 With a linear auction rule, the seller offers a uniform price against the coalition.
While this restriction is not without loss, it seems unlikely that the loss matters. Recall
from Lemma 1 that the seller can only charge a single price against the coalition for each
probability of sale, and that the sale price must be convex in the probability of sale. The
linearity restriction simply eliminates the strictly convex portion of the sale price. The convex
portion would matter only if the coalition is induced to choose a random purchase with a price
discount, but this latter feature seems unlikely to be appealing to the seller (although we have
9Alternatively, we can restrict attention to auction rules that allocate the object efficiently among the
collusive bidders. The analysis based on this restriction is available from the authors.
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not ruled out this possibility). In fact, most of the plausible auction rules allocate the object
deterministically as functions of bidders’ types. Any such auction rules can be implemented
by linear auction rules.10
Given the linearity restriction, the constraint in Lemma 2 implies
(K(θi)− r)qi(θ) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (6)

























The equality in (IC∗1) follows from Lemma 0, which utilizes bidders’ incentive constraints.
Hence, (IC∗1) follows from (IC
∗), which is necessary for any feasible auction rule. In fact,
without (K), the above maximization problem simply yields the second-best outcome. The
constraint (K) follows from the coalitional incentive constraint in (6) (which in turn follows
from Lemma 2). Since the program [C] only imposes necessary conditions for Weak Collusion
Proofness, its solution gives an upper bound for the revenue attainable by any linear WCP
auction. We show next that this upper bound is attainable by a WCP auction.
Theorem 5. Assume C = {N} and bidders are symmetric. There exists a WCP auction rule,
that implements the solution of [C]. Suppose Condition (SB) fails. Then, the optimal linear
auction rule involves a sales price, r0, that solves either
max
r∈R+
r(1− F n(K−1(r))) (7)
10As will become clear from the subsequent analysis, a solution to [C] below can be obtained even with an
additional constraint
∑
qi(θ) ∈ {0, 1}.
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or
E[J(θ(1)N )|θ(1)N > K−1(r)] = r, (8)
and an allocation rule qˆ(·) that satisfies
qˆi(θ) =
{
1 if θi > max{maxj∈N\{i} θj, θˆ0}
0 otherwise,
(9)
where θˆ0 := K
−1(r0).
The features of optimal WCP auctions are illustrated by the next example.
Example 3. Assume that there are two bidders whose types are uniformly distributed on
interval [m,m+ 1]. Then, J(θ) = 2θ − (m+ 1), K(θ) = 2θ −m, and θˆ = min{m+1
2
,m}. The






















if m > mˆ,




.11 Observe that the optimal WCP auction rule implements the second-








, θˆ0 > θˆ, so it involves more exclusion than the
second-best outcome. Regardless of m, θˆ0 > m, so the optimal WCP auction always involves
exclusion. This is in sharp contrasts to the second-best outcome which does not involve any
exclusion if m ≥ 1.
Remark 2. Pavlov (2006) finds the outcome presented in Theorem 5 to be optimal in a more
restricted class of WCP auction rules, namely, those that are linear and symmetric. (Recall
the symmetry restriction is not invoked in the current paper.) In fact, he shows that there
are asymmetric or nonlinear auction rules that are WCP and yield higher revenue than the
optimal auction in the restricted class. However, such auction rules violate our Lemma 1 and
11More precisely, mˆ is a root of an equation,
(5m+
√
m2 + 12)(2m2 − 9m− 48) + 6(−2m3 + 9m2 + 46m+ 18) = 0.
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thus are not WCP in our model. This difference arises from the fact that we allow for a
reallocational ability by the coalition, which is not allowed in Pavlov (2006), at least for the
main analysis.
7 Conclusion
We have studied optimal weak collusion-proof auctions when a group of bidders can collude
not only on their messages (e.g., “bids”), but also on their participation decisions. We have
shown that, despite the strong collusive power, the asymmetric information facing the collusive
bidders can be exploited to significantly weaken their collusive power, by eliminating the scope
of collusive arrangements that could make all collusive bidders uniformly better off regardless
of their types. We show that the second-best outcome is achievable if there is a noncollusive
bidder or there are multiple bidding rings, or the outcome involves a nontrivial probability
of the object not being allocated to a collusive bidder. More generally, we have shown that
the optimal weak collusion-proof auction rule involves a positive probability of the object not
being allocated to a collusive bidder.
There are several areas of extending/improving our WCP auction design. First, as noted
in Remark 1, our auction design can provides incentives in dominant strategies up to a cer-
tain number of bidders, but it must rely on Bayesian incentives for some bidders. As is well
known, Bayesian implementation requires bidders to have accurate assessment of the distri-
bution of other bidders’ types, which may be unrealistic in many circumstances. Second,
we have assumed that the seller has accurate information about the coalition structure; i.e.,
which bidders may be potentially collusive with which bidders. While this assumption is not
unrealistic in many situations, it would be better if the auction design need not require specific
knowledge about the coalitional structure. It seems important and useful to understand how
relaxing these features affects an auction designer’s ability to deal with collusion.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 0. It suffices to show that (IC∗) implies the following: for all i ∈ N and
all θ˜i ∈ Θi,
UMi (θi) = E
[
Ki(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≤θi} + Ji(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≥θi} − Ti(θ˜i)
]
. (10)
Note first that a well-known necessary condition for (IC∗) is: for all i ∈ N and all θ˜i, θi ∈
Θi,




We show that (11) implies (10). Since UMi (θ˜i) = θ˜iQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i), (11) becomes




Taking expectation on both sides regarding θ˜i yields


























Ki(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≤θi} + Ji(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≥θi} − Ti(θ˜i)
]
,
where the third equality follows from the integration by parts.
Proof of Lemma 1. To begin with, define TC(θC) := Eθ˜N\C [
∑
i∈C ti(θC , θ˜N\C)] and QsC :=
{Q ∈ QC |Q = QC(θC) for some θC ∈ ΘC}. Then, let us define r : QC → R+ as the greatest
convex function such that for all Q ∈ QsC ,
r(Q) ≤ inf{TC(θC)|QC(θC) = Q}.
We show that r(QC(θC)) = TC(θC) for almost every θC . Suppose not. Then, it must be that
for some  > 0,
E [r(QC(θC))] +  < E [TC(θC)] . (12)
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≤ r(Q(θC)) +  and EµC(θC)[QC(θ˜C)] = QC(θC). (13)
We now show that M cannot be WCP with respect to C by constructing a weakly feasible
manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) of M by coalition C with which some bidder is better off than with
M .
Let the coalition manipulate its type reports using µC(·), whereafter, the object is reallo-





i∈C wi(θC) = 1, satisfying (R
M
C ).
Note that the interim allocation for each collusive bidder i ∈ C is preserved since




= ωi(θC)EµC(θC)[QC(θ˜C)] = ωi(θC)QC(θC) = q
C
i (θC), (14)
where the second equality follows from changing the order of expectations, the third from
(13), and the last from the definition of ωi(·).
Next, the coalition manipulates the transfer rule as follows: Letting tµi (θ) := EµC(θC)[ti(θ˜C , θN\C)],
set t˜j(θ) = t
µ
j (θ) for each j ∈ N\C, and for each i ∈ C,
t˜i(θ) = t
µ
i (θ) + Eθ˜−i
[
ti(θi, θ˜−i)− tµi (θi, θ˜−i)
]
















i (θ), which satisfies (BB
M
C ) while (BB
M
N\C)
































where the inequality follows from (12) and (13). So, (IC∗) and (IRCN) are satisfied for collusive
bidders, due to (14), (15), and κi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ C, which means that M˜ is a weakly feasible
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manipulation of M . Also, some collusive bidder is better off than in M since κj > 0 for some
j ∈ C.
Proof of Lemma 2. To begin, we adopt the convention that θ∅ < θi for all i ∈ N . We
observe that QC(·) and qCi (·) inherit the monotonicity of qC(·) and qi(·), respectively, and
hence are a.e. continuous. Also, since r(·) is convex with r(0) = 0, p(·) is nondecreasing and
hence a.e. continuous also. Suppose to the contrary that (2) does not hold for almost every
type profile. Then, we can find some bidder k ∈ C and a positive measure set ΘˆC−k ⊂ ΘC−k
such that for each θC−k ∈ ΘˆC−k, there exist θk ∈ Θk and θ′k ∈ Θ satisfying
(Kk(θk)− p(θk, θC−k))qCi (θk, θC−k) < (Kk(θk)− p(θ′k, θC−k))qCi (θ′k, θC−k).
Then, the a.e. continuity of qCi (·) and p(·) guarantees that for each θC−k ∈ ΘˆC−k, we can find
two types θˆk(θC−k) ∈ Θ and ˆˆθk(θC−k) > θˆk(θC−k) such that for all θk ∈ (θˆk(θC−k), ˆˆθk(θC−k)],
(Kk(θk)− p(θk, θC−k))qCi (θk, θC−k) < (Kk(θk)− p(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k))qCi (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k). (17)
We now define
ΘˆC := {(θk, θC−k) ∈ Θ|θC−k ∈ ΘˆC−k and θk ∈ (θˆk(θC−k), ˆˆθk(θC−k)]},
qˆCk (θC−k) := q
C
k (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k), and pˆ(θ−k) := p(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k). Note that (17) holds for all
θC ∈ ΘˆC .
In order to draw a contradiction, we construct a weakly feasible manipulation of M ,
M˜ = (q˜, t˜), which makes bidder k better off.
Consider the following report manipulation, denoted µC : ΘC → ∆ΘC , and reallocation
scheme by the coalition: if θC /∈ ΘˆC , then report truthfully and do not perform any reallocation

















once the object is assigned, reallocate it to bidder k with probability 1, and (iii) choose
(θ∅, · · · , θ∅) (or nonparticipation) with the remaining probability.12 This manipulation will
12It is important to make sure that the probability of reporting truthfully or (θˆ(θC−k), θC−k) does not exceed
30
result in the following allocation probabilities: for bidder i ∈ C\{k},










= qCi (θC) if θC ∈ ΘˆC ,
and simply q˜Ci (θC) = q
C
i (θC) if θC /∈ ΘˆC . Likewise, for bidder k, if θC /∈ ΘˆC , then q˜Ck (θC) =
qCk (θC), or else if θC ∈ ΘˆC , then
q˜Ck (θC) = QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
qˆCk (θC−k)
QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
= qˆCk (θC−k). (18)
It can be easily verified that q˜Ck (·, θC−k) is nondecreasing for every θC−k.13 Thus, the interim
allocation Q˜i(θi) = Eθ˜C−i [q˜
C
i (θi, θ˜C−i)] is also nondecreasing for each i ∈ C.










































≤ qCk (θC)QC(θC) . This holds trivially if θˆk(θC−k) = θ∅. If



















where the inequality holds since QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k) ≤ QC(θk, θC−k) and qCi (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k) ≥ qCi (θk, θC−k)
for all i 6= k, by the monotonicity of QC(·) and qCi (·).
13To see this, consider arbitrary θk and θ′k with θ
′
k > θk, and θC−k: (i) if (θk, θC−k), (θ
′
k, θC−k) ∈ ΘˆC , then




k, θC−k) = qˆ
C
k (θC−k), (ii) if (θk, θC−k) ∈ ΘˆC and (θ′k, θC−k) /∈ ΘˆC , then θˆk(θC−k) < θk ≤
ˆˆ
θk(θC−k) < θ′k and thus q˜
C
k (θk, θC−k) = q
C
k (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k) ≤ qCk (θ′k, θC−k) = q˜Ck (θ′k, θC−k). And other cases









pˆ(θC−k)qˆCk (θC−k)− p(θC)qCk (θC)
]
(19)
Next, t˜(·) is constructed as follows. For each j ∈ N\C, set t˜j(θ) = EµC(θC)[tj(θ˜C , θN\C)].
For each i ∈ C, we set


















− UMi (θi) for i ∈ C\{k}, and ρk = − ∑
i∈C\{k}
ρi.
By construction, then t˜ satisfies (BBMC ) and (BB
M
N\C).
We now complete the proof by showing that M˜ is a weakly feasible manipulation and
makes bidder k better off. To this end, observe that for an arbitrary θk ∈ Θk,
























k (θ˜C)− qCk (θ˜C))1{θ˜k<θk} + Jk(θ˜k)(q˜Ck (θ˜C)− qCk (θ˜C))1{θ˜k>θk}
−
(
pˆ(θ˜C−k)qˆCk (θ˜C−k)− p(θ˜C)qCk (θ˜C)
)]




















The first equality follows from Lemma 0, the second from (19), the third from the rearrange-
ment and (18), and the inequality from (17) and the fact that for all θ˜C ∈ ΘˆC ,
Jk(θ˜k)(qˆ
C
k (θ˜C−k)− qCk (θ˜C)) ≥ Kk(θ˜k)(qˆCk (θ˜C−k)− qCk (θ˜C)),
since qˆCk (θ˜C−k) ≤ qCk (θ˜C) and Jk(θ˜k) < Kk(θ˜k).
From the construction of t˜(·), one can easily verify that U M˜i (θi) = UMi (θi), ∀i ∈ C\{k}.
Then, (20) implies U M˜k (θk) > U
M
k (θk) for all θk ∈ Θk or bidder k is better off. The construction
of t˜(·) and monotonicity of Q˜i(·),∀i ∈ C guarantee that M˜ satisfies (IC∗) for all collusive
bidders. The proof will be complete if (IRMC ) holds for all i ∈ C\{k}:












i (θi),∀θi ∈ Θi
since U M˜i (θi) = U
M
i (θi) and Q˜i(·) = Qi(·), ∀i ∈ C\{k}.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose an auction rule M = (q, t) ∈ M WCP implements the
second-best outcome. Then, q(·) = q∗(·) and Ui(θi) = 0 for all i ∈ N , which implies by














By Lemma 1, there exists a convex function r(·) that represents the total payment for the
coalition.
We first consider the case C = {N}. Since q∗N(θ) = 0 or 1 for all θ ∈ Θ, Lemma 1 implies
that p(θ) = r∗ whenever q∗N(θ) = 1. We first prove θˆi > θi for all i ∈ N . Suppose not. Then,
there exists k such that Jk(θk) ≥ max{maxi∈N\{k} Ji(θi), 0}. It follows that q∗k(θ1, · · · , θn) > 0,
so p(θ1, · · · , θn) = r∗. Since r∗ ≥ V ∗ > θi = Ki(θi), we have a contradiction to (2).
We next consider the case C 6= {N}. Fix any C with |C| ≥ 2. If no such C exists,
there is no collusion, so we are done. For each bidder i ∈ C and his type θi ∈ Θi, let
Xi(θi) := Pr{θC−i ∈ ΘC−i | Ji(θi) > maxk∈C\{i} Jk(θk)} be the probability that i has the
highest virtual value among the collusive bidders, and let Yi(θi) := Pr{θN\C ∈ ΘN\C | Ji(θi) >
33
max{maxk∈N\C Jk(θk), 0}}. Letting pi(θi) := r(Yi(θi))Yi(θi) for each i ∈ C, Lemma 2 implies that,
∀θi ≥ θˆi
(Ki(θi)− pi(θi))Yi(θi) ≥ max{0, max
θ′i∈[θˆi,θi]
(Ki(θi)− pi(θ′i))Yi(θ′i)}.
By the envelope theorem argument, ∀θi ≥ θˆi,






























































































The second and fourth equalities follow from integration by parts. To verify the fifth equality,
note that Yi(θˆi) = Pr{φi(θN\C) = θˆi}, Yi(s) = Pr{φi(θN\C) ≤ s} for each s > θˆi, and
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Zi(s) = E[q∗i (θ)|φi(θN\C) = s]. Combine this derivation with (21) and (22) to obtain (ii) of
Condition (SB).
Proof of Lemma 3. First, we prove that Condition (SB′) holds for any C with 2 ≤ |C| < n.

















































(1− F |C|(θ))d (θFN−|C|(θ))− ∫ θ
θˆ
|C|(1− F (θ))FN−1(θ)dθ




































(N − |C| − 1)(1− F |C|(θ))FN−|C|(θ) + |C|(1− F (θ))FN−1(θ)] dθ > 0,
satisfying Condition (SB).




Proof of Theorem 2. Since Mˆ implements V ∗, it suffices to prove that Mˆ is WCP. To this
end, consider any C ∈ C with |C| ≥ 2. Suppose all bidders outside C report truthfully, but
coalition C contemplates a manipulation of Mˆ , M˜ = (q˜, t˜), that satisfies (IC∗C) and (IR
Mˆ
C ).
Then, there exists a function µC : ΘC 7→ ∆ΘC such that (RMˆC ), (RMˆN\C), (BBMˆC ) and (BBMˆN\C)
hold.
























































The first equality follows from Lemma 0, the second from equation (BBMˆC ), the third from
the construction of tˆi(·) for i ∈ C, the fourth from the definition of δC(·), the fifth from (RMˆC ),
and the last equality from the above string of equalities repeated in the reverse order. Lastly,
the strict inequality follows from the definition of αC and the strict monotonicity of HC(·).
To see this, we compare the LHS and RHS of the inequality (24) at the ex-post level: (i) if




(HC(θi)−HC(θ(1)N\C))q˜i(θi) < HC(θk)−HC(θ(1)N\C) = RHS,
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(ii) if θk > max{maxi∈N\{k} θi, θˆ} for some k ∈ N\C, then any manipulated allocation different







(HC(θi)−HC(θk))q˜i(θi) < 0 = RHS,
(iii) if maxi∈N θi < θˆ, then q˜(θ) 6= q∗(θ) = 0 implies that the LHS is negative while the RHS is
zero. In sum, the LHS of (24) is always less than the RHS, which means that M˜ worsens the
(interim) payoff of either the highest type or the lowest type of at least one collusive bidder.
This contradicts that M˜ satisfies (IRMˆC ). We have thus proven that q˜(θ) = q
∗(θ) for almost
every θ.
It follows from this result that the gross surplus realized within C from M˜ is the same as
from Mˆ , and, combined with (4), that the coalition pays the same expected payments with
M˜ as with Mˆ . Hence, the net total expected payoff accruing to C from M˜ is the same as
from Mˆ . Together with (IRMˆC ), this implies that no bidder of C is strictly better off from
manipulation M˜ . Since this is true for all feasible manipulation of Mˆ , we conclude that Mˆ is
WCP.
Proof of Theorem 3. Define Tˆ (·) and tˆ(·) in the same way as in (33) and (34), except that
qˆ and r0 are replaced with q
∗ and r∗, respectively. Then, the argument that Mˆ = (q∗, tˆ)
satisfies (IC∗), and implements the second-best outcome without collusion, is similar to that
in the proof of Proposition 5.
To prove that Mˆ is WCP consists of several steps.
Step 1. Suppose that a feasible manipulation, M = (q, t), of Mˆ (by N) satisfies UMi (θi) >
U Mˆi (θi) for some i ∈ N . Then, there exists another feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) that
satisfies
U M˜i (θi) = U
Mˆ











14This follows from the fact that noncollusive bidders always report truthfully so collusive bidders can change
the allocation only by announcing that one of them has at least θk > θˆ, and getting themselves allocated the
object.
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Proof. Consider a bidder k for whom UMk (θk) > U
Mˆ
k (θk). We construct a mechanism M˜ which
satisfies (IC∗), (IRMˆN ), and U
M˜
k (θk) = U
Mˆ
k (θk).
We first construct an ‘auxiliary’ mechanism M ′ which will be used to construct M˜ . Let
us begin by defining Θ′ ⊂ Θ as
Θ′ := {θ ∈ Θ|θk ∈ [K−1k (r∗), θˆk) and θi < θˆi,∀i 6= k},
which must have a positive measure due to Condition (SB∗). The allocation rule is constructed
as








Clearly, q′(·) results in a nondecreasing interim allocation probability for each agent. Next,
let us construct the transfer rules, T ′i (·) and t′i(·), as in (33) and (34) except that qˆ(·) is now
replaced by q′(·) with ρi’s to be determined later. Then, M ′ = (q′, t′) satisfies (IC).15 Note
that M ′ can be obtained by manipulating Mˆ in the following way: if θ ∈ Θ′, then bidder
i report some θ′i > θˆi and others report truthfully, and if θ /∈ Θ′, then all bidders report



















































































15Note that M ′ need not satisfy (IR) since it is just an auxiliary mechanism used to construct M˜ .
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where the inequality follows since Kk(θk) > r
∗ for θ ∈ Θ′. Thus, we can pick ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
with
∑
i∈N ρi = 0 such that U
M ′
k (θˆk) > U
Mˆ
k (θˆk), and U
M ′
i (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi) for each i 6= k.
For such ρ, we have
UM
′






























= U Mˆk (θk),




i (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi), ∀θi,∀i 6= k
UM
′
k (θk) < U
Mˆ
k (θk) and U
M ′
k (θk) > U
Mˆ
k (θk) if θk ≥ θˆk.
(26)
Finally, we construct M˜ satisfying the desired properties. For dosing so, consider a linear
combination of M and M ′, denoted Mλ := λM + (1− λ)M ′ = (λq + (1− λ)q′, λt+ (1− λ)t′)
for λ ∈ [0.1]. Note that for any λ, Mλ satisfies (IC) since both M and M ′ satisfy (IC). Note
also that Mλ is a manipulation of Mˆ since both M and M ′ are manipulations of Mˆ . Letting
Uλi (·) := UMλi (·), (26) implies
Uλi (θi) = λU
M
i (θi) + (1− λ)U Mˆi (θi) ≥ U Mˆi (θi), ∀λ, ∀i 6= k, (27)
Uλk (θk) = λU
M
k (θk) + (1− λ)UM
′
k (θk) > U
Mˆ
k (θk), ∀λ < 1,∀θk ≥ θˆk, (28)
U0k (θk) = U
M ′
k (θk) < U
Mˆ
k (θk) and U
1
k (θk) = U
M
k (θk) > U
Mˆ
k (θk). (29)
From (29) and the linearity of Uλk (·) regarding λ, there exists λ˜ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying U λ˜k (θk) =
U Mˆk (θk), which implies
U λ˜k (θk) ≥ U λ˜k (θk) = U Mˆk (θk) = U Mˆk (θk) for θk < θˆk. (30)
Letting M˜ ≡M λ˜, M˜ satisfies (IRMˆN ) due to (27), (28), and (30).
If there is any other agent i for whom U M˜i (θi) > U
Mˆ
i (θi), then we can start from M˜
constructed above and repeat the same procedure as above to construct another M˜ under
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which U M˜i (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi). To repeat in this fashion will yield U
M˜
i (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi) for all i ∈ N ,
establishing the first equation of (25). The second equation follows immediately from (IRMˆN )
and (28).
To state the next step, we define Θ∗ := {θ ∈ Θ|maxi∈N Ji(θi) ≥ r∗}.





(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q˜i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi ≥ 0. (31)
The inequality holds strictly unless q˜(θ) = q∗(θ) for almost all θ ∈ Θ∗
Proof. Consider another allocation rule, q¯(·), with q¯i(θ) = q˜i(θ) if θi ≥ J−1i (r∗) and q¯i(θ) =
q∗i (θ) otherwise, and let Q¯i(θi) := Eθ−i [q¯(θi, θ−i)], for each i ∈ N . (Whether Q¯i(·) is monotonic


































where the inequality follows from the definition of q∗(·) and becomes strict unless q˜(θ) = q∗(θ)

















with the inequality being strict unless q˜(θ) = qˆ(θ) for almost all θ ∈ Θ∗.
Step 3. For any feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) of Mˆ that satisfies U M˜i (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi),∀i ∈
N , we have ∫ J−1i (r∗)
θi
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q˜i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ N. (32)
The inequality holds strictly unless Q˜i(θi) = Q
∗
i (θi) for all θi ≤ J−1i (r∗).




[Q˜i(a)−Q∗i (a)]da = U M˜i (θi)− U M˜i (θi)− [U Mˆi (θi)− U Mˆi (θi)]
= U M˜i (θi)− U Mˆi (θi) ≥ 0.













Xi(θi)d [(Ji(θi)− r∗)fi(θi)] ≤ 0,
since (Ji(·)−r∗)fi(·) is increasing. The inequality is strict unlessXi(θi) = 0 for all θi ≤ J−1i (r∗),
that is Q˜i(θi) = Q
∗
i (θi) for all θi ≤ J−1i (r∗).
Step 4. Mˆ is WCP.
Proof. Consider any feasible manipulation M = (q, t). We claim that UMi (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi),∀i ∈
N . Suppose not. By Step 1, we can find another feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) satisfying
(25). Then, Steps 2 and 3 produce a contradiction unless both (31) and (32) hold as equality.
But the latter fact implies that q˜(θ) = q∗(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ∗ and Q˜i(θi) = Q∗i (θi) for all
θi ≤ J−1i (r∗) and all i ∈ N . Thus, Q˜i(·) = Q∗i (·) for all i ∈ N , which implies that for all i ∈ N
and θi,














which contradicts the second equation of (25). Thus, it must be that UMi (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi),∀i ∈
N . Again, Steps 2 and 3 imply that Q˜i(·) = Q∗i (·) for all i ∈ N . But then, M yield the same
interim payoffs as Mˆ to the bidders, proving that Mˆ is WCP.
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose a pair, r0 and qˆ(·) solves [C]. We construct an auction rule
Mˆ = (qˆ, tˆ) that implements the same payoff as the solution of [C] for the seller and is WCP.










































where ρi ∈ R with
∑
i∈N ρi = 0. Since
∑
i∈N tˆi(θ) = r0
∑














we can choose ρi’s so that each bidder’s participation constraint is satisfied. Observe also










for some constant ci, implying that (IC
∗) is satisfied. Therefore, Mˆ implements the solution
of [C].



























where the inequality follows from the definition of qˆ(·) and becomes strict unless q˜(·) = qˆ(·).


























which, along with (IRMˆN ), implies that U
M˜
i (·) = U Mˆi (·), ∀i. We thus conclude that Mˆ is WCP.
We now characterize a solution to [C], assuming that Condition (SB) does not hold. We
first show that the solution involves the allocation rule of the form described in (9), whatever
the value of r0 is. Let λR and λK denote the Lagrangian (nonnegative) multipliers for the











Since the maximand is symmetric across bidders and linearly increasing with each qi, the
optimal allocation should follow the efficient cutoff rule: Namely, there exists a threshold
value θ¯ such that the rule allocates the object to a bidder whose type is highest and above
θ¯. Next observe the constraint (K) must be binding at the solution; or else, the solution
corresponds to the second-best outcome. This yields a contradiction, since the solution is
WCP implementable and the second-best outcome cannot be WCP implementable without
Condition (SB). Therefore, (K) is binding, from which it follows that θ¯ = K−1(r0).
The optimal sale price r0 depends on whether (IC
∗
1) is binding or not. If (IC
∗
1) is not




E[J(θ(1)N )|θ(1)N > K−1(r0)] > r0.
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